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Abstract 
We introduce a new interpretation of two re­
lated notions - conditional utility and utility 
independence. Unlike the traditional inter­
pretation, the new interpretation render the 
notions the direct analogues of their prob­
abilistic counterparts. To capture these no­
tions formally, we appeal to the notion of util­
ity distribution, introduced in previous paper. 
We show that utility distributions, which 
have a structure that is identical to that of 
probability distributions, can be viewed as 
a special case of an additive multiattribute 
utility functions, and show how this special 
case permits us to capture the novel senses of 
conditional utility and utility independence. 
Finally, we present the notion of utility net­
works, which do for utilities what Bayesian 
networks do for probabilities. Specifically, 
utility networks exploit the new interpreta­
tion of conditional utility and utility indepen­
dence to compactly represent a utility distri­
bution. 
1 Introduction 
There has recently been a growing interest within AI 
in representing and reasoning about utility. There 
are several reasons for this. First, while probabilis­
tic methods have gained much influence, probability 
is only one ingredient of decision theory; foundations 
of decision theory are based on utility functions as 
much as they are on probability distributions. Second, 
just as there exist applications which call for reason­
ing purely about probabilities, there exist applications 
that call for reasoning purely about utilities. Examples 
include a software agent that needs to reason about the 
• This work was supported in part by NSF grant IRI-
9503109. 
utility functions of other agents in a bargaining situa­
tion, and a meal-planning program needing to under­
stand the gastronomic preferences of the user. 
As we argue in previous paper [7]1, it would be 
quite convenient if we had a mechanism analogous to 
Bayesian networks to reason purely about utilities. As 
we further note there, at the heart of Bayesian net­
works lie three concepts: probability distribution, con­
ditional probability, and probability independence. If 
we manage to mirror those notions in the case of util­
ities, we will have potentially availed ourselves of a 
ready-made mechanism for reasoning about utilities. 
In [7] we introduce the notion of utility distribution.2 
Here we concentrate on the notions of conditional util­
ity and utility independence, and the derived notion of 
utility networks. 
While not the main focus here, as we shall see, this 
paper does shed some new light on the notion of util­
ity distribution itself. Specifically, while the treatment 
in [7] derives the notion from scratch, as a side effect 
of considering notions such as utility independence we 
will end up re-deriving the notion of utility distribution 
as an extension of standard decision theoretic notions, 
in particular those encountered in multiattribute util­
ity theory (MAUT) [5, 3]. 
Indeed, most papers in AI that attempt to do some­
thing interesting with utilities appeal to MAUT, and 
to notions of conditionalization and independence 
therein. This is true of earlier work on influence di­
agrams that introduces multiple (additive or multi­
plicative) value nodes [6], and more recent papers by 
Bacchus and Grove [1] and by Doyle and Wellman [2]. 
I think that there are two reasons why researchers 
have concentrated on the classical notions of condi-
1 Despite the publication dates, [7] describes work car­
ried out almost a year before the work described here. 
2We furthermore define the notion of a hi-distribution, 
which contains both a probability and utility distribution, 
but this will not play a major role in this paper. 
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tiona! utility and utility independence. First, the de­
cision theoretic literature itself (most notably, Keeney 
and Raiffa's [5]) presents compelling arguments in fa­
vor of these notions. Second, the terms themselves 
suggest an analogy with conditional probability and 
probabilistic independence, leading to this vague hope 
that the utility-based notions will yield similar com­
putational advantages. 
The decision theory literature reinforces the anal­
ogy between the probabilistic and utilitarian notions. 
Here's a quote from [5]: 
One of the fundamental concepts of multi­
attribute utility theory is that of utility in­
dependence. Its role in multiattribute utility 
theory is similar to that of probabilistic inde­
pendence in multivariate probability theory. 
(p.224) 
I argue that this analogy is misleading. The classical 
sense of utility independence has fundamentally dif­
ferent properties from those of probabilistic indepen­
dence. However, there exists a different sense of utility 
independence for which this analogy holds in a precise 
sense. The same is true of conditional utility. 
Let me illustrate these two senses of conditional utility 
through an example. Referring to the hypothetical 
meal-planning program mentioned above, consider two 
conditional utilities: 
• The utility for John of having beef for the main 
course, given that the appetizer is salmon mousse. 
• The utility for John of having beef for the main 
course, given that John is vegetarian. 
These are fundamentally different senses of conditional 
utility. The first conditions on an objective fact; 
loosely speaking, it can be thought of updating the 
utility based on information learned about the state 
of the world. The second conditions on a mental fact; 
loosely speaking, it can be thought of as updating the 
utility based on information learned about the prefer­
ence structure of the agent. We might call the first 
'objective' conditional utility, and the second 'subjec­
tive' conditional utility. 
An analogy may be instructive here. The KR and 
database communities have learned to distinguish be­
tween updating a knowledge base and revising it [4]; 
the first reflects changes in the world, the second 
changes in information about the world. A similar 
distinction must be drawn with respect to conditional 
utilities. 
The standard notion of conditional utility (and derived 
notions of utility independence) in decision theory is of 
the first variety, and it is the one commonly discussed 
in AI. However, this version of conditional utility is the 
one least similar to conditional probability. Perhaps 
for this reason, and despite great ingenuity on the part 
of the various authors, this notion has not yielded a 
computational device similar in nature and power to 
Bayesian networks.3 
In the rest of this paper we do the following. First, 
we briefly review the basics of MAUT and the stan­
dard notion of utility independence (and conditional 
utility). Next we extend those notions to include 
the notion of utility distribution. We then formally 
present the alternative notions of utility independence 
and conditional utility, which are directly analogous to 
their probabilistic counterparts. We conclude with an 
a computational application of these ideas, and intro­
duce the notion of utility networks. 
2 Multiattribute utility theory 
(review) 
Every utility function is defined over a set of states, 
and maps each state to a real value (its utility). 
In multi-attribute utility theory (MAUT) [3, 5] one 
posits a set of n attributes with corresponding domains 
D1, D2, . . . , Dn, and the set of states is defined to be 
the Cartesian product Dt x D2 x ... x Dn. 
In general, specifying a MAU function can be expen­
sive, exponential in the number of attributes. How­
ever, under special conditions the representation can 
be more compact. The general scheme for specifying 
these conditions goes like this: One defines certain "in­
dependence conditions" on the n attributes, and then 
provides a "representation theorem," stating that un­
der these independence conditions the utility function 
can be specified in a certain compact form. The re­
mainder of this section summarizes these conditions 
and corresponding specialized representations. 
We first note that a utility function u over a set of 
states S induces a preference ordering �u on lotteries 
(or probability distributions) over S via the expected 
utility construct: 
where Pt and p2 are any two lotteries over S. More 
generally, in the case of MAU functions, a utility func-
3Bacchus and Grove [1] do propose a graphical model 
in which to represent conditional independence, motivated 
by the analogy with Bayesian networks. However, their 
graphical model is very different from Bayesian networks 
(for example, arcs in it are undirected), and has not to date 
suggested a computational method. This is not detract 
from the contribution of this very interesting paper, only 
to correct possible misperception of its content. 
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tion defines preference on lotteries conditional on cer� 
tain attribute X having particular values x: 
PI t P2(givenX = x) 
'¢::::::::> 
EsEspi(s I X= x)u(s) 2:: Es E SP2 (s I X= x)u(s) 
Given this, we can define the general notion of utility 
independence. In the following definition, Y and Z are 
sets of attributes (in most applications, Z will be the 
complement of Y): 
Definition 1 (based on [5], p.226) Y is utility in­
dependent of Z when conditional preferences on lotter­
ies on Y given Z = z do not depend on the particular 
value of z. 
Using the notion of utility independence we define two 
independence conditions on a set of attributes. The 
first definition doesn't appear in the literature as a 
definition or given this name, but these will be conve­
nient: 
Definition 2 (based on [5], p.293) Attributes 
X1, ... , Xn are singulary utility independent if every 
X; is utility independent of X;. 
The next definition involves stronger independence 
conditions: 
Definition 3 ([5], p.289) AttributesX1, ... ,Xn are 
mutually utility independent if every subset of 
{X 1, .. . , Xn} is utility independent of its complement. 
The third and final type of independence involves a 
stronger condition than either of the first two: 
Definition 4 ([5], p.295) Attributes X1, ... , Xn are 
additive independent if preferences over lotteries on 
X 1, ... , Xn depend only on their margmal probability 
distributions and not on their joint probability distri­
bution. 
The relative strength of these three properties is re­
flected in the different representation theorems they 
allow. Starting off somewhat qualitatively, here is a 
rough description of four special forms of MAU func­
tions that are based on these three independence con­
ditions. 
The first column specifies the independence condition 
on attributes, the second column names the special 
form in which the utility function can be represented, 
and the third gives some properties of this special form: 
ind. cond. I special form some properties 
singular multilinear n simple utility func-
tions; ex-
ponential number of 
constants; exponen-
tial number of addi-
tions and multiplica-
tions 
mutual no standard n simple utility func-
name tions, n constants, ex-
ponential number of 
additions and multi-
plications. However, 
this form always col-
lapses to one of the 
following two special 
_eases 
none multiplicative n simple utility func� 
stated tions; n constants; n 
additions and multi-
plications. 
additive additive n simple utility func-
tions; n constants; n 
additions and multi-
plications. 
Although the above table omits details, it does show 
that, as can be expected, stronger forms of utility in­
dependence admit more economical representations of 
the utility function. Indeed, additive independence 
(and even the more specific notion of conditional ad­
ditive independence, in which additive independence 
holds given certain attributes) is the one that has at­
tracted some interest recently in AI, and the one that 
is most relevant to us here. Given this, let us define 
the additive form of MAU functions precisely: 
Definition 5 (adapted from [5], p.295) 
A MA U function u over variables x1, .. . , Xn is addi­
tive iff there exist functions u1, ... , Un and constants 
kt,·· . , kn such that u(x1, ... ,xn) = Ei=1k;u;(x;). 
(In fact, in the current context the constants k; play 
no role and could be omitted, but they will be useful 
in the sequel. ) 
3 From additive utility functions to 
utility distributions 
One way in which to view our alternative perspective 
on utility independence is through a specialization of 
additive MAU functions. Our starting point is an ex� 
ample used by Bacchus and Grove. Consider two vari­
ables, H (healthy) and W (wealthy), and the following 
utility function: 
u(HW) = 5, u(HW = 2), u(HW) = 1, u(HW) = 0 
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It is easy to verify that H is utility independent of W, 
and vice versa (intuitively, one prefers being healthy 
to being sick regardless of whether one is wealthy or 
poor, and vice versa). However, H and Ware not ad­
ditive independent. Consider two lotteries Pt and P2 
defined by pr(HW) = 1/4,p1(HW = lj4),p1(HW) = 
1/4,pt(HW) = 1/4 and P2(HW} = 1/2,p2(HW = 
O),p2(HW) = O,p2(HW) = 0. PI and P2 have iden­
tical marginals on H and W, but while the expected 
utility of p1 is 2, the expected utility of p2 is 5/2. In­
tuitively, a person with this utility function prefers the 
synergy of health and wealth more than is predicted 
by their individual utilities. 
Now consider a modified example, in which u(HW) = 
3 (and the other values remain unchanged). It is not 
hard to see that in this case H and W are additive 
independent. 
This modified example is both instructive and mislead­
ing. It is instructive because it demonstrate that, un­
like the notion of utility independence which is quali­
tative in nature (it merely compares various numbers), 
additive independence is arithmetic in nature. How­
ever, it is also misleading because this example has 
more properties than are required by the notion of ad­
ditive independence. Specifically, the attributes in this 
example are binary in nature; you are either healthy 
or not. The more general case would allow for multiple 
values of health and of wealth. 
However, while too specialized to be a neutral repre­
sentative of additive utility functions, this example is 
representative of a new, more specific class, which we 
define next. 
Definition 6 Given a vector of boolean attributes 
X =  x1, ... , Xn {that is, each with domain {0,1}), 
a utility function u over X is TIOLI ("take it or 
leave it") iff there exists constants k1, ... , kn such that 
u(x1, ... , Xn) = Ef=l kiXi. 
The interpretation of a TIOLI utility function is best 
explained through our modified example. Health con­
tributes 2 to one's joy (or utility or satisfaction), 
Wealth contributes 1, and the total utility experi­
enced in any given state is simply the sum of the 
joys supplied by the elements present in the state -
u(HW) = 2+ 1 = 3, u(HW) = 2+ 0 = 2, and so on. I 
will call the attributes of a TIOLI MAU function util­
ity factors or simply factors, to denote the fact they 
are thought of as representing the basic ingredients of 
one's mental state of satisfaction. 
It is worthwhile to mention here that MAUT is com­
pletely agnostic about the interpretation of attributes. 
In some examples each attribute is some good such 
as sugar or flour, its value denote the quantity of the 
good consumed in a state, and a state then becomes 
interpreted as a bundle of goods (on which one might 
bid in an auction, for example). In a different inter­
pretation, the different attributes are days of the week, 
their values are the rewards experienced in each day, 
and their combination (for example, via addition or 
weighted addition) describes the overall utility expe­
rienced during the week. TIOLI functions admit the 
more psychological interpretation discussed above. 
Finally, we note that the various k;s can be translated 
and scaled to lie in the interval [0 .. 1] and to sum to 1. 
This yields the special form of TIOLI utility functions 
called utility distributions: 
Definition 7 Given a vector of boolean attributes 
X = X1, .. . , Xn, a utility function u over X is a 
utility distribution iff there exists constants k1, . . . , kn 
such that {a) 0 � k; � 1, (b) L:j=1k; = 1, and {c) 
u (x1, ... ,xn ) = Ej=1kiX;. 
Clearly, the structure of a utility distribution is essen­
tially that of a probability distribution, except that 
the measure is applied to utility factors rather than 
to events. In fact, all that remains in order to make 
the two measures identical in structure is to lift the 
domain of the utility distribution to sets of factors. 
This is done in the obvious way; the utility of a set of 
factors is the sum of the individual utilities.4 
The notion of utility distribution was introduced al­
ready in a previous paper [7], where it was defined in­
dependently of any pre-existing notion. I've re-derived 
the notion here in the context of multiattribute utility 
theory in order to be able to contrast different senses 
of, e.g., utility independence in the next section, but 
let me briefly mention here a few more elements dis­
cussed in [7]. 
The reader might be concerned about the applicabil­
ity of these notions. We have discussed a progression 
of increasingly strong constraints on the structure of 
the utility function, and one might worry that the 
4We have seen that some standard special forms of 
MAU functions - in particular, the additive form - come 
with a representation theorem, stating necessary and suf­
ficient conditions on the preference relation over lotteries 
that permit the special form in question. One might ask if 
similar necessary and sufficient conditions exist for TIOLI 
functions or utility distributions. This is a question that 
I haven't looked into closely thus far, but it seems that 
there do not exist simple, compact conditions. Obviously, 
a necessary condition is that the preference among lotteries 
depend only on the marginals, but it seems that the ad­
ditional requirements needed to make this also a sufficient 
condition are not as neat. However, given my preliminary 
state of understanding, and the fact that this question will 
not play a role in the sequel, I won't pursue this further 
here. 
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strongest constraint - the utility distribution form- is 
too rare to be of interest. It turns out that this is not 
so, at least in principle. For any utility function- even 
one not in MAU form- we can find a set of factors and 
a utility distribution over them, such that original util­
ity function can be reconstructed from these factors. 
The only hitch is that the set of factors might not be as 
small as one would like. In the examples given above 
(the health/wealth, and the cars examples) the num­
ber of factors was logarithmic in the number of states. 
However, in general it will range between logarithmic 
and linear. 
I have not discussed here how one can combine 
probability distributions and utility distributions into 
one framework. In [7] I define the notion of a hi­
distribution. Briefly, a hi-distribution is a structure 
consisting of a probability distribution and a utility 
distribution, with undirected arcs connecting some fac­
tors with some states. What is important to emphasize 
here is that one cannot in general define a probability 
distribution and a utility distribution on the same set. 
In effect, when one carves up the world into a set of 
elements, one usually makes a choice - these elements 
can be additive in probability (in which case they are 
called ' states ') or additive in utility (in which case they 
are called 'factors ') , but not both. However, given two 
such different sets of elements, one can define a third 
set by taking the Cartesian product of the first two. 
The elements in this induces set are additive in both 
probability and utility, but do not typically correspond 
to an intuitive concept. 
4 Defining subjective senses of 
conditional utility and utility 
independence 
Let us now reconsider the notions of conditional util­
ity and utility independence, in the context of util­
ity distributions. Since utility distributions are MAU 
functions, we can apply (any of) the standard notions 
of conditioning and independence to them. However, 
unlike arbitrary MAU functions, utility distributions 
also allow us to define the subjective versions of these 
two notions, discussed in the introduction. 
Let's start with conditional utility. In the subjective 
version of the notion, we interpret u(x]y) as "the utility 
of x, given that u(y) = 1, or, that all the utility is 
derived from the factor set y." 
This can be explained intuitively through an example. 
Consider a person whose entire value system is based 
on owning any or all of three cars, a Rolls Royce, a 
Maserati, and a Ford. We define three correspond­
ing utility factors, with the k;s defined by u(r) = 0.1, 
u(m) = 0.2, and u(f) = 0.7. Thus, for example, if the 
person owned all three cars he would derive 0.7 of his 
utility from the Ford; this can be thought of as the 
prior utility of a Ford. But what would the contribu­
tion of the Ford to utility be if it is learned that the 
person derives no pleasure from British-made cars? By 
direct analogy with probabilities , we define subjective 
conditional utility by u(x\y) = u(x II y)/u(y). This 
gives us, in particular, that the utility of a Ford for a 
British-car-hater is 
u(f]fm) = u(f n fm)/u(fm) = u(f)/u(fm) = 
0.7 /(0 .7 + 0.2) = 7.77 ... 
Subjective utility independence will also be defined 
similarly; factor set x will be said to be utility­
independent of y iff u(x]y) = u(x). The intuition 
behind this property will be that the relative contri­
bution of the factor set x does not change if we learn 
that the entire contribution to joy lies within the set 
y. Thus in the car example, a Ford is not utility inde­
pendent of non-British cars, since 
u(f) = 0. 7 :f; 0. 77 . . . = u(flfm) 
However, if we add a Toyota and modify the k;s as 
follow:;: 
factor t 
utility 7/30 
then it's easy to verify that the utility of the class of 
cars made in English-speaking countries is indepen­
dent of the utility of European-made cars: 
u(fr]rm) = tt(fr) = 0.66 . . .  
5 Utility networks 
Our goal at the outset was to investigate the possibility 
of endowing utilities with the properties of probabili­
ties, so that the benefit of Bayesian networks can trans­
fer to them. We've now achieved this, so it might be ar­
gued that the rest of the story is anti-climactic. Since 
now we have notions of ut ility distribution, conditional 
utility, and utility independence that have exactly the 
mathematical properties of their probabilistic counter­
parts, we can, it might be argued, go ahead and use 
Bayesian networks to represent and reason about util­
ities. (Of course, the term Bayesian networks should 
now be replaced by something more appropriate. We 
might use terms utility network, or u-net, when we are 
using the Bayesian-network-like structure for utilities, 
and p-net in the case of probabilities.) 
Left at this, however, this might be deemed little more 
than a formal exercise. There are at least two sources 
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of potential complaint. The first is that utility fac­
tors might not correspond to anything intuitive, and 
hence could not be used in practice. The second is 
that Bayesian networks have proven useful because the 
structure of such networks reflects causality; it is our 
intuitive grasp of causal relations in the world that 
allows us to construct and understand Bayesian net­
works. What's to help us make intuitive sense of utility 
networks? Let me address these two potential com­
plaints in turn. 
I don't know whether utility factors will in general turn 
out to be intuitive or not; I think we don't have enough 
experience to pronounce judgement on this. However, 
we do not need to reason about factors directly. This is 
exactly analogous to probabilistic reasoning. Bayesian 
networks do not represent individual world states; in 
any realistic domain, these would be impossibly com­
plex for any human to comprehend. Rather, each vari­
able represents an event, a set of states, which ab­
stracts away from all but a few aspects of the world. 
The events "it rained," "the lawn was watered," and 
"the pavement is wet," are examples of such abstrac­
tions. We will do the same with factors, and reason 
only about sets of factors, such as "having money," 
"being admired by a loved one," and "owning a mo­
torcycle." 
If these sets of factors seem indistinguishable from 
events, this is no accident. While in general the set 
of individual states and the set of individual factors 
are disjoint, certain sets of states and sets of factors 
might be co-extensive. In [7] I discuss how for any 
utility function defined on states one can construct a 
dual, factor space such that the utility of each original 
state is the sum of some subset of factors in the dual 
space. In general, every event (set of states) defines a 
set of factors, and every set of factors defines an event. 
When a given set of factors and a given event define 
each other, they are co-extensive. 
Detailed discussion of this is beyond the scope of the 
paper. Hopefully the examples to come will give more 
intuition, and in particular clarify the general point 
about not having reason about individual factors. But 
here's the most important point. We shouldn't fret 
over whether nodes in a network are events sets of 
factors, or both. The critical question is the interpre­
tation we give to the links in the network, that is, to 
the relationships between the nodes. 
Which brings us to the second issue, causality. Al­
though I'm in general suspicious about cavalier uses 
of the causal terms in AI, and in particular about 
the purely causal interpretation of Bayesian networks, 
there is no denying that most of the Bayesian networks 
actually produced in fact correspond to intuitive no-
tions of causality, typified by the standard example: 
burglar-
John cilll5-
The intuitive interpretation of this example is that 
either an earthquake or a burglary can trigger your 
house alarm, which in turn can cause both of your 
neighbors- John and Mary - to call you at work. In­
deed, it is hard to imagine how one would come up 
with this network without appealing to causality. Sim­
ilarly, given the causal interpretation, it is intuitively 
clear why John's calling you is probablistically inde­
pendent of there being an earthquake given that the 
house alarm went off. 
Can any concept play the role of causality in utility 
networks? I think the answer is yes, and that the con­
cept is teleology, a form of "mental causality." Con­
sider two factor sets, "love of art" and "visiting the San 
Francisco Museum of Modern Art (SFMOMA)." The 
utility one places on Art determines, at least in part, 
the utility of SFMOMA. In other words, SFMOMA 
is desired inasmuch as it contributes to satisfying the 
Art desire. It seems to me that this familiar utilitarian 
notion serves just the purpose needed here. Consider 
a more elaborate example: 
GS-PDrelalod 0 Anrt�� 
/\ 
0 SFMOMA I 0 
Dirt Bike Mag 
The way to interpret this picture is as follows. The 
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person whose utility is modeled has two basic moti­
vators - love of BMW GS-PD motorcycles, and love 
of art. In service of the GS-PD motivator, the per­
son place a certain value on owning one of these bikes, 
and on reading Dirt Bike magazine, which covers dual­
purpose motorcycles such as the GS-PD. The Art mo­
tivator leads him to desire to go to SFMOMA, as well 
as to own an original de Kooning. Both the consider­
ation of owning a GS-PD and that of owning the de 
Kooning lead the person to place a certain value on 
money. The graph structure induces various indepen­
dence conditions. For example, the utility of money 
given that the person wishes to purchase a GS-PD is 
independent of his love of motorcycles. 
This is presumably a natural and familiar pattern. In­
deed, it is a causal pattern, but one must be care­
ful about the nature of this causal relation. Consider 
again the link between Art and SFMOMA. There are 
at least three causal connections one might be tempted 
to identify here. First, satisfying the SFMOMA desire 
will cause the higher satisfaction of the desire for Art. 
Second, the desire for Art will cause the person to de­
sire to visit SFMOMA. Third, the desire for Art will 
cause the person to actually visit SFMOMA . In utility 
networks, the links capture the first two kinds of causal­
ity, but not the third. Utility networks do not speak 
about what will be the case, only about a person's 
mental state. Indeed, whether the person will actually 
visit the museum might be determined by factors that 
are unrelated to the person's preference structure, just 
as even the most intense interest in the GS-PD will not 
necessarily result in the person buying one. 
This is not to say that mental state doesn't impact re­
ality, only that utility network don't capture this fact. 
Although this lies beyond the scope of this paper, let 
me add a few words on reasoning simultaneously about 
probabilities and utilities, in a structure we might call 
a bi-network. I've mentioned already that in [7] I de­
fine a hi-distribution, which couples a probability dis­
tribution (or p-distribution) with a utility distribution 
(or u-distribution) . We can represent a hi-distribution 
by a pair of networks, a Bayesian network (or p-net) 
and a utility network (or u-net). If the two were un­
related that wouldn't be interesting, but in fact a hi­
distribution includes a set of undirected edges between 
nodes in the two distributions, which can be used to 
induce utilities on the p-net and probabilities on the 
u-net. 
In a simple version of hi-networks, computation in each 
net will proceed independently; in particular, we can 
condition the two nets independently from one an­
other. Just as influence diagrams use utility nodes 
merely to compute values resulting from the proba­
bilistic conditioning, in simple hi-networks links will 
be used to merely compute expected-utility values re­
sulting from both probabilistic and utilitarian condi­
tioning. 
A more ambitious version of hi-networks will allow 
"hybrid" forms of conditioning, in which the p-net 
and the u-net share nodes, and, more interestingly, one 
can condition probabilities on utilities and vice versa. 
However, this remains an avenue for future investiga­
tion. 
6 Summary 
The ideas described in this paper are part of a con­
tinuing enquiry into the role of choice theory in AI, 
and the questioning of some established assumptions 
in choice theory. The main messages synthesized so 
far as a result of this inquiry are as follows: 
• There is no reason for the traditional asymmetries 
between probabilities and utilities. In particular, 
utilities too can enjoy distributions. This is the 
main focus of [7], and was discussed here only 
partially, 
• There exists a sense of conditional utility that is 
different from the classical one, and utility dis­
tributions provide a way to define it. The. same 
is true of utility independence. This has been 
the primary focus of this paper. For this reason, 
the related work discussed throughout the paper 
is mostly that which pertains to utility indepen­
dence. 
• The interpretation of classical results in decision 
theory, and in particular the von Neumann and 
Morgenstern representation theorem, is opened to 
question. This is discussed in [7] but not here. 
• Utility networks can do for utilities what Bayesian 
networks do for probabilities, with the concept 
of teleology replacing that of causality. This was 
discussed in the previous section. 
• The new perspective suggests a structure, called 
a hi-distribution, in which probability and util­
ity distributions live side by side, and which can 
be used to compute expected utilities. This too 
is discussed in [7] but only mentioned here, with 
brief discussion of how it suggests the notion of 
hi-networks as a generalization of both Bayesian 
networks and utility networks. 
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